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The Hungarian Party System in 2010: More Polarized, less Plural 
 
Looking at the 2010 election from a comparative perspective it is tempting to invoke 
Giovanni Sartori’s (1976) use of the term ‘polarized pluralism’ to describe the Italian 
party system in the 1970s and suggest that the Hungarian party politics is best described 
as polarized, but not-so-plural. The central puzzle is that the combination of a party 
system dominated by two large parties and an electoral system with a strong majoritarian 
component has resulted in centrifugal, rather than centripetal, competition. Sartori linked 
polarized pluralism in Italy to the country’s proportional electoral system. Most 
comparative politics scholars associate majoritarian electoral systems with Downsian 
convergence on the median voters (Downs 1957). However, Hungary’s 2010 election 
seemed to confirm the trend over the last decade: toward polarization in a two-party (or at 
least two-bloc) system. Three other (and related) aspects of the Hungarian 2010 election 
stood out as unusual compared to developments elsewhere in Central Europe. First, 
Fidesz-KDNP secured more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, and thus the power 
to re-write the constitution. Second, the most stable party system in post-communist 
Central Europe underwent dramatic change. Two long-established small parties fell 
below the electoral threshold and seemingly disintegrated, leaving only two of the six 
parties that won seats in the 1990 election still standing. Third, Jobbik emerged as the 
third largest party, closely behind MSzP in terms of both votes and seats. These 
developments raised questions not only about Hungarian party politics, but also about 
whether and to what extent this fits into a broader European pattern. Was this a peculiar 
result of an unlikely set of circumstances; the consequence of the medium-term 
development of the Hungarian party system; or can it be seen as part of a broader trend in 
European politics? 
 
In order to begin to answer these questions, this chapter investigates the origins and 
nature of Hungary’s 2010 ‘earthquake election’. Fidesz’s path to power in the spring of 
2010 involved the usual combination of astute political strategy, weak or discredited 
opponents and an element of political or economic crisis that so often characterise major 
electoral change. The centre-left coalition had been in power for eight years, under three 
different prime ministers (albeit run more or as a less technocratic interim government for 
the last year). It had presided over an economy in crisis. The last two elections had been 
too close to call before the polling booths closed. These are factors that have been seen 
elsewhere in Europe, both separately and in this combination. However, the Hungarian 
story also featured its own more or less unique elements. The most important was the 
polarisation of party politics. Although the party system was remarkably stable in the 
1990 and 2000s, the process of party system stabilisation brought about two increasingly 
hostile blocs. In the 1990 election a broad three-party ‘Christian national’ bloc defeated 
both the socialists and the liberal bloc. By the end of the decade the Christian national 
bloc was falling apart, and Fidesz had taken over as the leading party on the right. SzDSz 
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had become the junior partner in a centre-left bloc led by the MSzP. The 2002 and 2006 
elections were dominated by these two blocs. By 2010 this two-bloc contest had been 
reduced to a two-party contest between Fidesz and MSzP.  
 
The approach taken to analysis of party system development and change in the present 
chapter is one that focuses first and foremost on political parties as strategic actors. This 
perspective sees political parties (or more specifically, the party leadership) as more or 
less rational agents that that try to combine a series of goals that might not always be 
compatible: attracting votes, gaining executive office, influencing policy and surviving as 
an organisation. The proposition put forward in what follows is that the 2010 election can 
be seen as the latest development in the process of party system stabilization in Hungary 
in the sense that consolidated the MSzP – Fidesz rivalry at the core of the party system. 
The stabilisation the party system involved a reduction in the number of parties, 
particularly as the ‘right’ consolidated in the shape of Fidesz-KDNP, but it also involved 
a pattern of gradual polarisation. Fidesz’s rise involved a clear shift toward the cultural 
right in the 1990s, consolidating the mainstream right and marginalising the extreme 
right. After its defeat in 2002 Fidesz’s electoral strategy involved strong opposition to the 
government rather than a return to the political centre. Anti-communism and rhetoric 
about oligarchy and incomplete regime change returned to the political agenda, in sharp 
contrast to the declining role such questions played in other post-communist EU states. 
This process was far from inevitable, and can be understood as the result of a series of 
contingent decisions about party strategy that could easily have turned out otherwise.  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a brief 
review of the 2010 election, and the core characteristics of the Hungarian party system in 
2010. The second section present a brief analysis of the political parties strategies and 
strategic choices in the two decades leading up to 2010, particularly as a contest between 
the non-socialist parties as to who would dominate and define ‘the right’. The third 
concluding section returns to the opening questions, and assesses the Hungarian party 
system anno 2010 in a comparative perspective.  
 
 
A comparative take on the 2010 ‘earthquake election’ 
 
In the literature on comparative European party systems, the term ‘earthquake election’ 
was first used widely to characterise the Danish 1973 election, and to a lesser extent the 
Norwegian election of the same year. These elections saw the emergence of new populist 
anti-tax parties that fundamentally changed the dynamics of party competition; as well as 
the rise of post-materialist socialist left parties. The label fits the Hungarian 2010 election 
well, since it saw two new parties win seats, neither of which fit into the established 
pattern of party competition. Both were protest parties. Jobbik had long been an 
insignificant fringe party on the far right, but emerged as a strong nationalist challenger 
on Fidesz’s right flank in when it polled 14.8% in the 2009 elections for the European 
Parliament and won 3 MEPs. LMP was established as a green alternative to a discredited 
political establishment, building on commitment to social justice and participatory 
politics. Its first national poll was the 2009 EP elections, when it took 2.6% and secured 
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no MEPs. Both were ‘anti-parties’ in the sense that they eschewed the term ‘party’, 
criticised all the established parties for corruption, and presented themselves as clean 
alternatives. With Fidesz-KDNP soundly defeating the MSzP, the SzDSz and MDF 
falling below the threshold for representation, and the two new parties winning 
representation, 2010 was Hungary’s ‘earthquake election’. 
 
 
Table 1 – percentage of votes (list votes) and percentage of all the 386 seats 
 1990  1994 1998 2002 2006  2010
Party Votes seats votes seats votes seats votes Seats votes seats votes seats
MSzP 10.9 8.5 33.0 54.1 32.9 34.7 42.1 46.1 43.0 49.2 19.3 15.3 
SzDSz 21.4 23.8 19.7 17.9 7.6 6.2 5.6 5.2 6.5 5.2 - - 
Fidesz 8.9 5.4 7.0 5.2 29.5 38.3 41.1 42.5 42.0 42.2 52.7 68.1 
KDNP 6.5 5.4 7.0 5.7 2.3* 0.0* 3.9* 0.0* * * * * 
MDF 24.7 42.7 11.7 9.8 2.8 4.4 ** 6.2 5.0 2.8 2.7 0.0 
FKgP 11.8 11.1 8.8 6.7 13.2 12.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 
MIEP - - 1.6 0.0 5.5 3.6 4.4 0.0 2.2 0.0 - - 
Jobbik - - - - - - - - *** 0.0 16.7 12.8 
LMP - - - - - - - - - - 7.5 4.1 
Others 15.8 2.8 11.2 0.6 6.3 0.3 2.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.3 
* The KNDP split in 1997, had some MPs elected for Fidesz in 1998 and 2002, before re-uniting and 
effectively joining Fidesz in 2006 and 2010. 
** MDF ran on a joint list with Fidesz in 2002; and thus won 24 seats.  
*** Jobbik ran with MIEP in the ‘Third Way’ alliance in 2006. 
 
The most remarkable aspect of the 2010 election was also the most widely predicted: 
Fidesz’s overwhelming victory. In 2002, after four years in government with the MDF 
and FKgP, Fidesz had came close to becoming the first governing party in Hungary to 
win re-election. Its defeat in 2006 came as a surprise. By 2010 the polls were clear: 
Fidesz-KDNP was set not only to win, but win an absolute number of the votes and 
capture two-thirds of the seats. The Socialists’ defeat was the other side of the same coin. 
Both parties had changed their profiles since the mid-1990s, and achieved a dominant 
position on their side of the political spectrum. Perhaps the main characteristic that stands 
out is the extent to which MSzP adopted a more pro-market stance than its main “centre-
right” competitor on a number of issues. Fidesz’s electoral campaigns, particularly in 
2006 and 2010, came across as increasingly populist rather than free-market 
conservative. However, this is hardly unique in post-communist Europe: Slovakia and 
Poland have provided ample examples of parties that are nominally on the right but 
which programmes are far form free market. A comparison with Italian or Norwegian 
politics reveals a similar pattern: in 2006 and 2010 Fidesz was far closer to Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà or the Progress Party in Norway than to 
traditional Italian Christian Democrats (let alone the Christian Democratic Union in 
Germany) or Norway’s Conservatives in terms of both policy and electoral strategy.  
 
In terms of economic policy it is tempting to conclude that the majoritarian elements of 
the electoral system, which rewarded the winners of the 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2010 
elections with seats far out of proportion to their share of the votes (see table 1), may 
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offer some clues to the pattern of competition between the two main parties. Given the 
economic reforms introduced by the 1994-1998 MSzP – SzDSz government, their defeat 
in 1998 came as no surprise. By 2002 both Fidesz and the MSzP had learned the lesson 
well. With a less controversial economic policy Fidesz almost managed re-election in 
2002. When the MSzP – SzDSz coalition returned to power. Consistent and prudent 
economic policy took a lower priority than re-lection. Consequently the coalition 
managed to secure re-election in 2006. Ferenc Gyurcsány’s effort to reverse this policy 
famously backfired when his message to a meeting of Socialist MPs to the effect that the 
state of the economy was far worse than any party had admitted (and that therefore in 
effect he had lied in the campaign) was leaked in the run-up to the October local 
elections. If the Hungarian experience in the 1990s and 2000s hold one lesson, it is a 
lesson in the difficulties of managing tight economic policy in the context of winter-
takes-all electoral systems. Given the economic ‘vale of tears’ that transition from 
communism inevitably involved, it was no surprise that anti-incumbency voting was 
strong across post-communist Europe in 1990s. However, in Hungary the majoritarian 
part of the electoral system has re-enforced this trend more than a PR-system would have 
done. It may even have contributed to extending this phenomenon well into the 2000s. 
 
The second ‘earthquake’ aspect of the 2010 election was the disappearance of the SzDSz 
and MDF. Although this was hardly a surprise, since both parties had come perilously 
close to the threshold for parliamentary representation in 2006 and were polling poorly in 
the opinion polls in for more than a year leading up to the election, both were long-
established features of the Hungarian party system. Their fates are hardly unique to 
Hungary: the SzDSz story has been shared by a number of West European small coalition 
partners; and MDF demise reflected the dynamics of competition between liberal free-
market conservatives and the populist right in Central Europe (and perhaps across the 
whole EU). The story of the SzDSz is a near perfect illustration of ‘government-fatigue’, 
or the danger that participation in government as a minority partner holds for small 
parties. Kaare Strøm (1990) famously based his theory of minority government on the 
argument that small parties may be better off lending external support to a minority 
government in return for policy, rather than join a majority coalition and share the blame 
for policies they do not control. By 2009 SzDSz had participated in three such coalitions 
with the MSzP, none of which had done much to restore the party’s fortunes. The story of 
the MDF in the 2000s is one that several free-market liberal parties in formerly 
communist states have shared. As Fidesz moved toward the cultural right, MDF 
effectively leapfrogged Fidesz into the centre in the mid-2000. Ibolya Dávid took the 
party in the free-market liberal direction, particularly after the 2002 electoral defeat, but 
lost some support in the process. In 2006 she was rewarded with MDF’s crossing the 5% 
threshold. However, in 2010, the context of a broad popular backlash not only against the 
MSzP but also against the Bajnai government’s economic reform and crisis measures, 
this was hardly a winning strategy. 
 
For outside observers, particularly the European press, the biggest shock of the 
Hungarian 2010 election was nevertheless that a far-right party with links to a uniformed 
movement took 16.7% of the vote and became Hungary’s third largest party. Any 
explanation of Jobbik’s success in the 2010 election would have to involve the usual 
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factors associated with the rapid rise of parties on the extreme right: disaffected voters 
and discredited mainstream parties, anti-establishment protest, economic recession or 
unemployment, cultural protectionism in he face of globalisation, immigration or ethnic 
minorities, and a populist organisation that capitalises on this (Taggart 1995; Norris 
2005). In Hungary’s case the anti-establishment backlash was exacerbated by corruption 
(which affected all the established parties); the global economic crisis (which deepened 
the recession), the exceptionally high levels of unemployment in the north-east, and 
Jobbik’s rhetoric that linked crime to the governing parties, international capital and the 
Roma minority. However, the extreme political polarisation between government and 
opposition after the 2006 election and the leaking of Gyurcsány’s ‘lies-speech’ 
exacerbated this. Jobbik’s rise to power came in the context not only of discredited 
government, but in which the mainstream opposition party went far beyond the ordinary 
parliamentary channels of opposition, e.g. questioning of the legitimacy of the election 
result, organising street protests and boycotting the prime ministers parliamentary 
speeches. 
 
The second new party to enter parliament in 2010, LMP, was far more ordinary by 
comparative European standards. Built around a network of environment NGOs that 
spanned much of the left – right spectrum both in cultural and socio-economic terms, it 
may be compared to many of Europe’s green parties. Like Jobbik LMP made the most of 
the antiestablishment backlash, picked up on an anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist 
trend, and won support from a disproportionate share of young (especially first-time) 
voters; but it did this from the diametrically opposite ideology. Its effort to stay clear of 
both the both Fidesz and MSzP was reminiscent of the initial strategy of many West 
European green parties, as was its commitment to grass-roots participatory politics and its 
focus on the environment, tolerance and inclusion, and its rejection of the political 
establishment, clientelism and corruption. As the year 2010 came to a close, the question 
of how LMP would position itself in Hungarian parliamentary politics remained open, as 
did the future of the party itself.  
 
 
Party strategy, party competition and party system polarisation  
 
The central proposition put forward in this chapter is that the political developments that 
led to the 2010 election can be seen as part and parcel of the process of party system 
stabilization in Hungary, and that this process has been shaped more by the political 
parties strategic choices than by the underlying social structures of cleavages. This is by 
no means an effort to rehearse the tabula rasa  arguments of Offe et al to the effect that 
post-communist society was an “atomized and decapitated mass of ex-clients of state 
socialism” (1998:25). As other contributors to this volume have observed, social 
cleavages play a major part in shaping party politics. The point is rather that party 
strategy has played a remarkable role in shaping Central European party systems in the 
two decades since 1989 (Bakke and Sitter 2005). Looking across Europe in the twentieth 
Century, there are few or no similar cases in which the players of the political game been 
so free to elaborate the new institutional framework and explore and experiment with 
different strategies for competition; even if this takes place within the limits set by 
Nick Sitter, CEU and BI, 31 January 2011, p6 
electoral rules, voter alignment and the parties’ organisational resources. In Hungary, as 
in the rest of post-communist Europe, a number of very different strategies were pursued 
by a wide range of parties. Only a few proved successful in the long run. The key to this 
is party strategy.  
 
Party strategy may be defined as the link between goals and their achievement. This 
involves a broad formula for how a party is going to compete: what its ends should be 
and how to pursue these ends. In the classical party politics literature a party’s key aims 
were the pursuit of votes and office (Downs 1957, Riker 1962). This has since been 
supplemented by focus the pursuit of policy, which in turn shapes both coalition games 
and the pursuit of votes (de Swaan 1973; Budge & Laver 1986; Dunleavy 1991). Internal 
party management and organisational survival may be considered a fourth goal, which 
lies at the core of the party’s identity (Panebianco 1988). The central problem is that 
maximising one goal may entail merely satisficing another, or even fully-blown trade-
offs, and herein lies the dilemmas of party strategy (Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 
1999). Historically, most West European parties have come close to one of three 
strategies. The first is linked to the catch-all and cartel models of party organisation and 
involves an effort define the left – right dimension; the second and third represent 
alternative strategies for competition based on representing interests or ‘protest-parties’ 
that operate at the flanks of the party system (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Three Party Strategies 
 Protest: 
Competing at the 
flanks  
Catch-all:  
Defining left vs. right 
Interests: 
Cross-cutting left 
vs. right  
– 1880 
 
 Elite party 
 
 
1880 –  
 
 Mass party 
 
 
1919 –  
 
Anti-system party  Interest party 
1945 –  
 
 Catch-all party  
 
 
1970 –  Protest and new 
populist parties 
Cartel party  
 
Single issue party 
 
The three strategies represent different responses to the strategic dilemmas of prioritising 
and balancing different goals, and are closely related to (and derived from) the literature 
on party organisation. First, the mainstream parties that compete against each other and in 
effect define ‘left’ and ‘right’. Hence Kirchheimer (1966) and Katz & Mair’s (1995) 
dynamic models that have most parties evolving from elite or mass parties into catch-all 
or cartel parties as they adapt and develop in the pursuit of votes and office. Second, 
however, a number of parties have eschewed this strategy, choosing instead to focus on 
representing interests or a given constituency, and/or specific policies, often related to the 
very origins and identity (rasion d’être) of the party, and therefore competing across the 
left-right dimension. To the extent that left-right issues are less salient, these parties may 
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tend toward the ‘centre’ of the party system (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Third, and 
alternatively, some inter-war parties rejected liberal democracy and thus operated at the 
communist and fascist extremes, although their post-war successors have either 
modernised or been crowded out by socialist left and new populist parties at the 
respective flanks (Taggart 1995). To be sure, many parties represent a mix of strategies 
and some parties transform themselves from one type to another. In post-communist 
Hungary, as elsewhere in Central Europe, most of these strategies were attempted by one 
political party or another as the main contenders struggled to define the left – fight 
dimension of political competition and establish a dominant role on either side of the 
centre.  
 
Party system development in Hungary during the first decade after 1989 was primarily a 
question of deciding not only the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’, but also which parities 
would define the left and right in practice. As in Poland, the matter proved relatively 
straight-forward on the left side of the political spectrum. No party emerged to challenge 
the MSzP, which swiftly positioned itself near the centre, and won the 1994 elections. Its 
offer of a collation to the SzDSz in 1994 has been interpreted as a tactical deal partly to 
ensure legitimacy for government policy and partly because the MSzP right wing 
correctly assessed that an alliance with the SzDSz would enable it to disarm its own left 
wing. The smaller part’s willingness to join this coalition reflected a parting of the ways 
between SzDSz and Fidesz that began in 1993 (which in turn reflected the leadership 
struggles in Fidesz in 1993, when Orbán’s faction emerged victorious). The liberal 
parties’ disappointing performance in the 1994 election opened the door to the centre-left 
coalition, and despite a somewhat turbulent four-year coalition government both Mszp 
and SzDSz agreed to fight the 1998 election on a platform of continued coalition. This 
was their centre-left alliance consolidated, and the first elements of Hungary’s ‘polarised 
non-pluralism’ in place: the establishment of a centre-left bloc that was more pro-EU, 
more free-market oriented and more well-disposed to foreign capital than its competitors 
on the centre-right. However, this was contingent on the MSzP’s decision to offer after 
winning an absolute majority of seats on its own in 1994; the Fidesz and SzDSz’s 
decisions on leadership and policy profile in the previous year; and the strength of the 
right wing within the MSzP.  
 
The struggle to define and dominate the right followed a far less predictable pattern. The 
1990 election was a triumph for the Christian national right over its more market-oriented 
and cosmopolitan liberal rivals. However, two sets of strategic choices were to shape the 
development of the centre-right in Hungary in directions that would have seemed 
imponderable in 1990. The first was the divisions within the three victors of the 1990 
election, as each party divided over how to react to the electoral defeat in 1994. The 
second was the rise of Fidesz, as it moved into the space left open by the three Christian 
national parties in the mid-1990s and absorbed elements from all three parties. The MDF, 
KDNP and FKgP all split gradually, and over several stages, and all lost MPs to Fidesz. 
The KDNP formally split in 1997, and seven of its MPs were re-elected in 1998 when 
one of its two factions arranged to run on the Fidesz ticket (after the rump-KDNP failed 
to win seats in either 1998 or 2002, the party re-united under the Fidesz umbrella). Fidesz 
also picked up factions that left the FKgP and MDF: 11 ex-FKgP MPs were re-elected for 
Nick Sitter, CEU and BI, 31 January 2011, p8 
Fidesz in 2002, and 11 ex-MDF MPs in 2006. Although the story of the Hungarian 
centre-right in the 1990s and 200s is the story of Fidesz’s triumph under Orbán’s 
leadership, this story also includes divisions that haunted the three Christian national 
parties.  
 
The reduction of political space in Hungary also involved the marginalisation of the 
extreme right until about 2006, as Fidesz occupied a broad space on the political right. 
The Hungarian extreme right was born as a political force in its own right in 1993, when 
tensions within the MDF culminated in the expulsion István Csurka and the birth of 
MIÉP. Although MIÉP won representation in 1998, it failed in 2002 (albeit because of an 
increase in overall turnout rather than a drop its votes; Enyedi 2006). Although a weak 
organisation and a small and ageing membership were also important factors in the 
party’s decline, Fidesz move to the right probably also contributed to squeezing out the 
party. By contrast the next party to emerge on the right flank, Jobbik, soon developed into 
a far better organised party. From late 2006 the combination of Fidesz’s re-orientation 
toward the centre-right, the government’s unpopularity, and the increased public debate 
about ‘Gypsy crime’ opened a window of opportunity for Jobbik. The party’s anti-Roma 
rhetoric provided an additional edge to the traditional nationalist focus on the plight of 
Hungarian minorities abroad. By the end of 2009 Jobbik had taken third place in the EP 
elections, and organised the Alliance of National Movements with the Italian Fiamma 
Tricolore, the Swedish National Democrats and the Belgian National Front, which 
provides a good guide to who its counterparts in Western Europe are.  
 
Between 1994 and 2006 the Hungarian party system thus saw a realignment from three 
blocs to two; and from six parties to four. As in other post-communist states, party 
system development included a considerable measure of trial and error. Several strategies 
and ideologies were adopted and tested. On the left the MSzP’s strategy of centrist policy 
and economic reform in the 1990s, along with its coalition with SzDSz, effectively closed 
the space to new social democratic challengers. But it left the field open for a populist 
challenge on the right, based partly based on a critique of the government’s economic 
policy. On the right a wider set of strategies were tested: pre-communist parties with 
niche target audiences were revived (KDNP and FKgP); a new populist catch-all type 
parties was briefly successful (MDF in 1990); and a classic far right party even managed 
to secure election (MIÉP in 1998); before Fidesz’ new populist catch-all strategy 
eventually paid off in 1998. The MDF and MSzP found themselves in supporting roles: 
as junior coalition partners they faced the dilemma of going it alone and running the 
danger of losing votes to the larger and more viable parties, or remaining in the bloc and 
being associated with the policies of larger partners. Both chose economic policies that 
were more free-market than their respective partners and both saw heated debates on 
party strategy, which in turn contributed to their demise in 2009 and 2010. From 1998 
onwards Fidesz and MSzP each saw the other as its main competitor. However, unlike 
the cartel parties discussed by Katz and Mair these two parties found little common 
ground and hardly agreed on the government sharing the spoils of electoral victory with 
its defeated opponent. Both learned the lesson from MSzP defeat that year: economic 
reform and austerity measures do not make re-election likely. They fought each other not 
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so much on economic policy as on valence questions related to values, competence and 
corruption. Hungary’s decade of polarised two-party competition had begun. 
 
 
 
The Hungarian Party System in 2010: Polarized and bipolar, but stable? 
 
In 2010 the central characteristic of Hungarian party competition was the increasingly 
polarised competition between MSzP and Fidesz. The bitterly fought 2002 election had 
seen the largest opposition party (MSzP) criticise the main government party (Fidesz) for 
incompetence, corruption, abused of power and as damaging to democratic consolidation; 
four years later the pattern was reversed, with each party cast in the other’s role. The 
2010 campaign was almost as polarized. Although some comparisons with West 
European cases are obvious (Orbán’s party was hardly the first to emulate Berlusconi’s 
football chant-inspired slogan Forza Italia!), Hungarian party politics clearly represented 
an outlier in the set of European party systems in 2010 in terns of the level of polarisation 
between the two biggest parties. Fidesz showed no sign of moving to a more centrist 
strategy in the aftermath of the election; nor did MSzP. The obvious question is whether 
MSzP will be in a position to benefit if and when Fidesz experiences the backlash that 
most governing parties sooner or later face. Given the considerable unpopularity of 
MSzP, could another party emerge as the strongest opposition to Fidesz? West European 
history suggests that the big catch-all parties usually find a way to return to the centre; 
but the fate of the Slovak left provides a salutary warning. As it stands, however, there 
seem to be no major alternatives to the MSzP on the centre-left.  
 
The second question mark concerns the prospects for Jobbik and LMP. An important part 
of this question is whether Jobbik has mobilised to its full potential, in the near-ideal 
conditions of polarised and de-legitimised politics, or whether it can attract future 
disgruntled Fidesz voters. However, the focus on party strategy in the discussion above 
also points to the importance of how the mainstream parties on the centre-right and -left 
respond to the challenge from the far right. A recent study of how West European parties 
dealt with such challenges concluded that a combination of policy adjustment and 
consensus-building across the let-right divide may be the optimal strategy (Bale et al 
2010). Combined with the discussion above, this suggests that not only was the rise of 
Jobbik at least partly dependent on the broader polarised context of party competition in 
Hungary in the 2000s (and therefore not necessarily a signal of things to come elsewhere 
in Europe); but also that the Jobbik’s future prospects depend to no small extent on the 
strategic choices made by Fidesz and MSzP. A broader comparative analysis offers much 
less to say about the LMP. By the end of 2010 the party was broader and more divided 
than its main competitors, with some way to go before it could present a clear and 
consistent governing alternative to Fidesz. However, it had embarked on a process of 
institutionalisation that might form the basis for a broader challenge to the two big 
parties. Like Jobbik it may be seen as an example of a broader European phenomenon, 
but if there is a lesson to be drawn from the West European experience it probably 
concerns the imperative for green parties of positioning themselves in relation to one of 
the mainstream parties, as possible coalition partners. 
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In short, returning to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter as to whether the 
2010 election was a peculiar result of an unlikely set of circumstances, the consequence 
of the medium-term development of the Hungarian party system, or a part of a broader 
trend in European politics, the answer set out here emphasises the first two points. The 
2010 election reflected a combination of extraordinary circumstances (the ‘perfect 
storm’) and the gradual polarisation of party political competition. The extraordinary 
majority Fidesz-KDNP captured in the 2010 elections probably reflected the specific 
circumstances of this election: polarised two-bloc competition, economic crisis and 
extremely high levels of anti-incumbency voting; combined with the two long-standing 
smaller parties being divided over strategy. To be sure, whether the government will be in 
a position to use its power to re-write the rules of the game in its own favour is of course 
another question (and by the close of 2010 the signs were clear that it would try its best to 
do so). Jobbik’s success likewise seems at least partly the result of contingent factors, not 
least the polarisation of party competition in the 2010; and LMP clearly capitalised on the 
collapse of SzDSz in 2009 and the general level of disillusionment with both MSzP and 
Fidesz. At the very least, there is little evidence so far to suggest that Jobbik’s success is 
a clear signal of things to come in Europe. Jobbik may have capitalised on a backlash 
against free-market economic policy, European integration and globalisation; but it rise 
seems also to have required the particular polarised context that Hungarian politics 
provided in 2008-10. By the end of 2010 the MSzP – Fidesz axis of competition seemed 
the only stable component of the Hungarian party system: polarised, but not very plural.  
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